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Introduction
Rubber is the foremost plantation crop of the
tropical rain forest, and excepting sugar, the ir.ost
valuable plantation crop in the world. Fifty years ago
it had no importance in either commerce or industry;
today it is a major world conjnodity . Rubber has become
so indispensable to our modern industrial life thst the
question of its control has been at times an international
irritant. The United States, as the greatest consumer in
the world, is the most vitally interested in securing
adequate and reliable supplies at reasonable cost.
While governmental interference with the supply of
raw materials is not new, the numerous attempts made within
recent years to establish governmental control of raw mate-
rials have constituted this one of the outstanding economic
problems today, I have attempted to give a concise account
of one of these controls, the Stevenson Plan for restricting
the output of rubber from the British possessions in the
middle east.
The procedure followed was to give a brief history

ill
of rubber and conditions leading to control. I have set
forth the economic aspects of the industry, stated the plan,
assessed the effects of the restriction on the producer,
the consumer and the investor, and given probable reasons
for its failure. In the conclusion is set forth some
reasons for the lack of success in controlling prices of
staple commodities in general and criticizms of the Steven-
son Plan. Finally, since previous bitter experiences will
not deter the adoption of other control plans, I have given
in its embryonic state the latest proposed rubber control
scheme and its probable outcome.
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PART ONE
Brief History and Background



V/hen Columbus and his men made their first voyage
to the new world they found the Indians playing a game
with a ball made of rubber. Rubber was then called "gurr:".
The word "Gum" is the oldest English word for rubber. The
word "rubber" came into use at a much later date. In 1770,
about two hundred and seventeen years after rubber was
discovered, the greatest scientist. Priestly, happened to
notice that a piece of gum would erase lead pencil marks.
Because of this attribute, he called it "rubber". (a)
In the meant iiLe several men were trying to ma.ke
waterproof rubber cloth, which would meet the needs of a
northern climate. In 1823 iiachintosh invented a water-
proof cloth, by using a solution of rubber and naphtha
to cover and fill the tiny pores in the fabric of this
cloth he made raincoats which became known as "Mackintoshes",
and were very popular for a short time. These coats soon
went out of style because they were too sticky in warm
weather and too stiff in cold. Nevertheless, the name
Mackintosh to this day has remained in favor as a popular
name for waterproof coats.
All gum brought from America to England had to be
(a) "The Romance of Rubber", U.S. Rubber CoiLpany lS20-21,p.5
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brought in solid form. The liquid as it coiries from trees
curdles and hardens, and in order to make use of it, it
had to be changed back into liquid form. One v/ay to do
this was by means of heat, which melted the rubber. This
method was unsatisfactory because the rubber did not be-
come as hard as it had been before. In 1836 Hancock and
Chaffee, an Englishman and an Axherican, made the great
discovery that rubber, when kneaded under a moderate tem-
perature, became soft and pliable, so thr.t it could be
worKed into any desired shape. This was one of the great-
est steps in the development of rubber.
Nevertheless, the practical use of rubber for cloth-
ing and shoes was still impossible. The articles made would
still become soft and sticky in warm weather and hard and
brittle in cold.
Charles Goodyear spent many years trying to find
some means of working rubber so that it would act the same
all year round and under all kinds of weather conditions.
While experimenting with a piece of gum which he had mixed
with sulphur, he accidently dropped a piece on the hot lid
of a stove. Before he could snatch it off, some of the gum
had melted and fused with the sulphur. Alien cooled it
turned into something that seemed tougher and less sticky.
He soon found that by combining sulphur with rubber and

4treating with heat he could produce rubber which would be
the same under all weather conditions. This process was
called "vulcanization" or "curing".
This discovery made it possible to use rubber in a
coramercial way and the development of the industry now
became rapid, Goodyear made one more discovery which is
next in importance to his first. He invented hard rubber
or ebonite which invention was the real beginning of the
hard rubber industry.
Although great improvements in the manufacturing
processes of rubber have been made during the last century,
there have been until recently few improvements in the
method of harvesting. Until forty years ago, substantially
the same methods used by the Indians before the discovery
of America were still in use. The trees from v^rhich rubber
was obtained grew wild in the region of the Amazon, in
northern South America, and in southern Central America.
There was a great variety of trees and vines from which the
rubber fluid could be drawn, the most important and best
source was the "Hevea Braziliensis" . (b)
Rubber-bearing latex, unlike maple syrup, is found
only on the outside of the tree, directly under the bark.
The sap of the rubber-bearing tree is distinct from the
(b)"The Romance of Rubber", U.S. Rubber"Conipany, pp. lc-14

5latex and great care must be taKen in cutting the tree not
to cut too deeply; for if the sap of the tree becomes mix-
ed with the latex it has a harmful effect upon the result-
ing rubber.
Each native in gathering this latex, has his ovm
route, and after he has cut through the bark of his trees
and attached small cups at the base of the cuts, he makes
the round of his trees and empties the cups into a large
pail which he carries, ViHien he has filled his pail he
brings it to his hut or to the collecting stations to be
treated.
The rubber-giving latex cannot be allowed to stand
for any length of time for it spoils quickly. The native
builds a fire in a crude furnace fitted with a sharp cone-
shaped pipe which causes the smoke to rise in a small col-
umn. The fuel consists of palm-nuts and sticks, and these
give forth a heavy black smoke through the hole in the top
of the furnace. The natives then take their paddles, dip
them into the pails of latex, and move them about in the
smoke. The rubber is coagulated almost instantly and the
liquid is dried off by the heat, leaving a thin coating of
pure gum on the paddle. This dipping and smoking is repeat-
ed until a large ball or "biscuit" is formed , 'Alien this
becomes too heavy to hold comfortably, the native sets the

6stick with the biscuit on it in several forked sticks that
he has driven into the ground and continues to turn the
biscuit in the smoke; but instead of dipping the biscuit
into the latex, the latex is slowly poured over the top of
the biscuit. This is continued until the biscuit weighs
forty or fifty pounds. It usually takes several days to
build up a biscuit this size.
Other methods of collecting and coagulating rubber
are inferior and therefore produce a less desirable product.
The British Government took the first steps to attempt
the cultivation of rubber in a systematic manner. It com-
missioned H,A, Wickham to go to Brazil and obtain some seeds
of the Hevea trees, Wickham *s commission was made difficult
by the fact that the laws of Brazil forbade taking out of
the country any seeds of the rubber tree. These laws were
passed in order to enable Brazil to maintain its monopoly
of the crude rubber market, Hov/ever, VYickham smuggled a
supply of seeds to luigland, vvhere they v/ere planted in the
Royal Botanical Gardens, Although results were disappoint-
ing, enough seedlings were obtained to provide a supply for
experimental use in India,
These were planted in Ceylon, and in 1881 they show-
ed the first indication of success. Seven years later some
of the trees were of sufficient size to permit tapping and

7results were favorable. Thus was laid the basis for the
tremendous rubber-growing plantations of Ceylon, Java,
Sumatra, and the others. In order to make these planta-
tions successful a great deal of study was necessary, not
only with regard to methods of planting and cultivation,
but also kinds of soil and conditions of climate. A
complete scheme of rubber tree culture had to be worked
out.
So successful have the rubber plantations been that
cultivated rubber nov/ dominates the market. "In 1900 the
output of the plantations was only four tons of crude rubber,
while the wild forests (of Brazil mainly) produced 54,000
tons; by 1915 the output of the two sources was equal; in
1922 the production of the plantation article had grown to
340,000 tons, while the wild supply had decreased to 25,000
tons. Thus from a few seeds collected from the Amazon
valley have grown the vast rubber plantations in the east-
ern tropics, with over 300 million tre-,s and supplying over
95 percent of the world's needs from three million acres of
land (1925)". (c)
The rapidity with which the rubber industry shifted
from the tropical forest of the Amazon basin to great planta-
(c) Smith, J. Russel, "Industrial and Commercial Geography",
New Edition, p. 575

8tions on the other side of the earth is a marvel of economic
geography.
The causes for the rapid expansion of plantation
rubber in Southeastern Asia at the expense of wild rubber
of the Amazon and Central Africa are an interesting study
of the inescapable forces of econoniic laws. The more im-
portant of these causes are: (d)
1, The quality and quantity of wild rubber cannot
be depended upon. Due to the lack of control over
gatherers and the lacK of standardization of methods
and grades manufacturers could never be sure of get-
ting the same quality twice in succession from the
same source. Today production in such a large in-
dustry as tires, for example, demands strict grading,
freedom from foreign substance, and dependability
of supply.
S. Curing methods of the plantations are more
scientific
.
5. Labor is scarce and comparatively expensive in
the Amazon basin and Central Africa while there is
an enormous supply of cheap ana dependable labor in
thickly populated Southeastern Asia. \Mienever suffi-
(d) Reed, Virgil D., "The Principles of EconoiLic Geo-
graphy", 1933, pp. 845-46

9clent local labor is not available for the plantations
an inexhaustible supply of contract labor can be im-
ported from China and Inaia,
4. Lack of Capital in Brazil and Central Africa
and the inability to interest foreign capital in
rubber in those regions,
5. Scientific methods and labor saving devices
used on plantations actually reduce cost of produ-
ction far below that of gathering wild rubber.
Research and close control constantly improve both
product and methods.
6. Coffee failed in Southeastern Asia largely
because of fungus diseases, causing growers to
seek a substitute in rubber Vv'hile Brazil found
specialization in coffee, more promising,
7. Transportation facilities and nearness to
the ocean steamer give the present plantation
regions a great advantage over the Amazon and Congo
basins which are far inland.
8. Trees are planted in rows at proper spacing
and one laborer can gather the rubber from several
times the number of trees he could tend in the forest
where the trees are widely scattered.
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9. Hygienic conditions and medical care improve
the efficiency of labor on the plantations,
10, Wild rubber could not supply adequately the
rapidly expanding requirements of the automobile
industry.
"The modern plantation, with its rational, system-
atic, scientific utilization of land, with its laborato-
ries testing the product and devising ways for its im-
provement, with its experiment stations patiently labor-
ing for the biological improvement of the species, with
its scientific management and orderly control over labor
- in short, with all the advantages offered by modern
capitalistic enterprises - is infinitely superior, as a
mechanism for producing staples, to a band of serai-savages
ruthlessly exploited by so-called civilized people, them-
selves exploiting with equal ruthlessness the free gifts
of nature. This is a generalization to which exceptions
can no doubt be found; but as a matter of principle the
superiority of the plantation method is beyond question. " (e)
The Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Ceylon, Java, Southern
India, Borneo, Burma, Cochin-Ghina, various smaller islands
of the East Indian Archipelago, Brazil, Central America,
(e) Zimmerman, Erich V^,, "World Resources and Industries'^
,
pp. 283-84
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and the Congo basin all produce rubber but practically-
all of it comes from the Middle East plantations. About
70 percent is produced in British Asiatic possessions,
"The activity of the American automotive industry
entirely determines the profits or losses of the rubber
growers," (f) No other major commodity is so entirely-
dependent upon the state of health of a single industry.
Under the stimulus of prosperity in the automotive in-
dustry rubber prices went to |2.90 a poiind in 1910. In
1932 prices fell to 2.66 cents per pound. Several times
booms in American automobile manufacturing have threatened
acute shortages in rubber supply. The rapid growth of
the industry, particularly since 1905, was dependent upon
a rapid expansion of rubber plantations in the Far East.
"Although there have been some -maladjustments of supply
and demand with large temporary surpluses in periods of
depression many authorities still feel there are distinct
possibilities of a rubber shortage under normal world
conditions." (g)
The United States takes from 60 percent to 65 per-
cent of the total production of rubber. Of this about
three fourths goes into tire and tube production. The
(f) Reed, Virgil D., "The Principles of Economic Geography
"
p. 247
(g) ibid.
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next largest importer, the United Kingdom, imports only
about 10 percent of the total output.
The great importers are shown in the table below, (h)
Table I
Net Imports of Rubber
(long tons of 2240 pounds)
1921-25 1951 rank
United States 296,453 501,788 1
France 26,056 46,066 3
Germany 24,929 59,688 5
Japan 20,264 45,483 4
Canada 12,918 25,261 7
United Kingdom 11,978 85,170 2
Italy 9,762 10,149 9
U.S.S.R. 5,016 50,671 6
Belgium 1,952 11,009 8
If the future demand for rubber continues to in-
crease there are still enormous areas capable of expansion
and available in the present plantation regions. The
Amazon and Congo basins, however, have only a small labor
supply . The same is true in Central America, so that
expansion in these regions is limited. Improvements of the
trees and methoas still offer enormous possibilities, parti-
cularly the "budding" or grafting of high production stock
(h) Reed, Virgil D., "The Principles of Economic Geography"
p. 248
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onto the trunks of young trees of poorer strains. Within
the past few years the acre yield of plantation rubber has
been raised about threefold, (i)
A Review of Prices (j)
Throughout the history of the plantation rubber
industry price has borne little relationship to cost.
Prior to 1920 price was high relative to the cost of pro-
duction because such a price was necessary to ensure the
production of the marginal increments of wild rubber. This
period was followed by the depression of 1920-82 when
prices fell below what was at that Ume regarded as the long-
run competitive level. Then restriction of supply was put
into operation and price was maintained artificially presu-
mably above a long time competitive level.
The prices prevailing before 1920 gave a decided
stimulus to the production of plantation rubber but as the
period between the planting and the tapping of the rubber
trees is about seven years it was some time before this
influence was felt. World conditions combined to make the
reaction to this increased planting particularly severe
when it did come, ana it was this reaction that led to
(i) Reed, Virgil, D,, "The Principles of Economic Geography"
p. 249
(j) Whittlesey, Charles R., "Governmental Control of Crude
Rubber", pp. 6-8

14
the legal enforcement of restriction.
Following restriction of exports in 1922 prices
improved and while moderate, were remunerative during the
first tv/o years of restriction. In 1925 a buyers' panic
struck the market and prices rose to $1,2'5 per pound in
July, remained high until the spring of 1926, and then
fell in April below fifty cents per pound. From then
until early in 1928 prices were relatively stable around
forty cents. In February 1928 the Prime Minister announced
that as a result of the failure of restriction to sustain
prices at the desired level the Committee of Civil Inquiry
was to investigate conditions in the industry. The market
felt that this meant repeal and prices declined sharply from
37 cents to 25 cents per pound. With the official state-
ment of repeal prices dropped to eighteen cents. Although
restriction continued to hold certain supplies of rubber
off the m.arket the prospect of the early removal of the
measure caused its influence on prices to be relatively
slight and the price held steady about eighteen cents until
several months after the removal of restriction.

PART TWO
Econoiiiic Aspects of Rubber Production

A. Demand for Manufactured Rubber Articles Relatively Inelastic
In econoiLic theory it is coinnionplace that fluctuat-
ions in market price tend to equalize production and consum-
ption of any commodity by giving the producers a return
covering their costs, including interest and profit, at a
price consumers will pay, Vifhen maladjustments occur a rise
in price increases supply and restricts demand and a fall
in price produces the opposite effect. Ordinarily this
automatic reaction to price changes is rapid enough so that
while producers are eliminated from time to time most of
them may safely expect such compensation for their services
year in and year out as will ensure their continued existence
in the industry.
Peculiarities of supply and demand in the rubber
growing industry make it a partial exception to these gen-
eral principles, insofar as short run effects are concerned
and it was this fact that brought about governmental control.
In the first place the demand for manufactured rubber
goods is relatively inelastic so that the price may double,
as had happened in 1923, without reducing to any extent the
amount consumed. The inelasticity arose from the fact that
approximately 85 percent of the crude rubber consumed is
used in the manufacture of rubber tires and tire sundries
for automobiles. The demand for tires comes through the
16
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demand for automobiles and since the price of tires is
only a minor part of the price of the automobiles a rise
in the price of crude rubber has very little effect in
reducing demand. Since there is no satisfactory substi-
tute for crude rubber, except for the limited use of re-
claimed rubber, another important check on price rises is
removed, ^iVhere the demand for automobiles, and consequently
the demand for tires, runs ahead of the current crude rubber
supply the result is an extreme rise in the price of the
latter. Herein lies the explanation of the price movements
of 1925. When the price of crude rubber rose from 36 cents
per pound to 4^1.23 in a little over four months.
B. Inelastic Supply
In the second place the supply is inelastic in that
it is difficult in any short period of time to increase or
decrease materially the quantity available. In the case
of a manufactured article the period necessary for increasing
very substantially the quantity that can be offered for sale
may be a matter of weeks or months. Most of the important
agricultural products require a period of a year. Others,
such as livestock or fruit, may require a somewhat longer
time but there is usually a wide choice of substitutes
available and this fact tends to limit price fluctuations.
In the case of rubber from five to seven years are ordinarily
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required to bring a tree to the stage of productivity-
is that a rise in price, when production is at capacity,
is ineffective in causing any mar^ted increase in supply
within this period.
Important Data on the Production of Rubber (c)
Age at Age Average V/eight per
which bearing commercial yield tree, per acre
begins - bearing per
years begins tree
5-6 8-10 2-5 lbs. 300 lbs. per acre
(average yield)
Bear seed at 6 years averaging 500-600 per tree -
Germinate in 10-30 days.
C. Supply Fixed Under Free Competition
The supply under free competition is not responsive
to a decrease in the price of crude rubber but is at any
given time virtually a fixed quantity. Since a rubber
plantation, excepting the small native holding, represents
a large fixed investment which cannot be converted into
any other use without great loss, and since a crop unharvest-
ed is largely an irredeemable loss - the effect of cessation
of tapping being slight so far as the life of the tree is
concerned - v/hen the amount offered outruns the amoimt
(c) McMillan, H.F., "Tropical Gardening and Planting"
1925 third edition

21
demanded the resulting fall in price falls to check supply
and we have a decline in price to the point where variable
expenses are barely met. At such a price nev/ uses for
rubber as for example, in paving might enable consumption
eventually to adjust itself to production, but meanwhile
the growers would be seriously threatened with heavy losses.
D. Labor Recruited from Distant Points
The difficulty of suspending production duririg a
period of low prices is intensified by the fact that labor
has to be recruited from a distance, in the case of Ceylon
and Malaya mainly from Southern India, and in the case of
Sumatra from Java. As the coolies are generally under a
three year contract the impossibility of disbanding them
or replacing them on short notice is apparent. Further-
more, on account of the expense incurred in recruiting,
transporting from overseas, medical treatment, and train-
ing, the securing of an efficient labor force represents
a considerable investment which would be lost if the
workers were released even temporarily.
E. The Effect of Small Native Producers
The presence of a large and growing proportion of
small native producers further strengthens this inelasticity

22
of supply and even brings about perverse elasticity at
times. As early as 1925 over a third of the area under
rubber in the middle east was controlled by Orientals,
principally Malayans, Javanese, and Chinese. Their
holdings as a rule are small and the rubber has been
planted as a side line to the cultivation of rice, though
gradually rubber may have displaced the other crop in
importance, (d) At any rate, the capital investment is
low, equipment is the simplest and overhead is slight
since there is none of the management and home office
expense which enters into the cost of the rubber produced
on estates. Moreover, labor on the smaller holdings in-
volves practically no monetary outlay as the whole family
may be employed in tapping. Elsewhere, particularly in
the Netherlands East Indies, the worK is done on shares,
the owner taking half of the rubber produced and the tapper
the other half, (e) In either case a falling price may at
times actually stimulate production. The tapper or the
small ov-Tier operator desires to make a certain wage. At
the higher price for rubber he produces less and has m.ore
time for leisure, while as the price drops he works harder
and throws more rubber on the market in order to maintain
his accustomed standard of living, (f) There are limits
(d) Luytjes, A., "Native Rubber Cultivation in the Dutch
East Indies" VII Final Report, Charles Grenier & Sons Ltd.
1987, op. 5-6
(e) ibid. Chapters I, II, III, ilay 1925, pp. 39-40
(f) ibid.
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to this tendency, of course, a point beyond, which it is not
profitable for either owner or tapper to continue, but this
limit is below any price that could be met by the average
estate, because of the differences noted above, (g) Yihlle
the existence, therefore, of a large fixed investment tends
to make the supply of estate rubber inelastic, the exact
opposite of this situation tends to make the supply of
rubber from native holdings also inelastic. The fact that
the native may be entirely dependent upon the rubber pro-
duced may lead him to increase his output instead of reduc-
ing it v/hen price declines.
Where prosperous conditions have permitted the ac-
cumulation of a reserve on the part of native growers they
may reduce operations for a tln.e in the face of lower prices
so giving the appearance of an elastic supply, but are apt
to renew operations as their reserves decline even though
prices fail to rise. This is indicated by the chart on the
following page. With the decline in rubber prices in 19?^0-
21 the production of native rubber was greatly reduced and
remained low throughout most of 1921, Toward the end of
1921, and more especially after March 1922, the output of
native rubber increased although prices did not rise until
(g) According to a careful survey made by the Dutch Rubber
Growers' Association of Batavia the cost price of unsmoked
native rubber is aroimd 7 cents per pound. - "Iir^alayan Tin
and Rubber Journal", Ipoh, Straits Settlemc:;nts, September
30, 1922, p. 106
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October 1922. It may, perhaps, be assumed from this that
native planters who had accuniul&ted certain savings during
the prosperous years just after the V/ar were able to re-
duce their output considerably when prices fell in 1920-21.
Toward the end of 1921 these savings had largely melted
away so that the natives were compelled to begin producing
rubber again even though price had not improved. That the
moderate decline in prices during 1923 should fail to check
output was to be expected in view of the fact that the price
was still relatively high, v;hile the previous increase in
price was too recent to have led to a very strong financial
position among the natives.
F. Small Producers Militate Against Restriction
The existence of this large group of st.all producers
militated against the plans for voluntary restriction of
production mooted during the slump years of 1920-22. In
many cases distance and ignorance would have prevented any
attempt to secure their cooperation, while in other cases
the lacK of other means of securing a livelihood made them
in
unwilling to agree to any reduction/the amount of rubber
they could produce.
G • Territorial Concentration
The marked territorial concentration in the production
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of the great bulk of the world's supply is a further
characteristic of the rubber supply. In 1822, the year
in which governmental control of the export of rubber
was instituted, 7 percent of the world's supply was wild
rubber principally obtained in Brazil, The regaining
93 percent caine from the plantations of the middle east,
and of this 93 percent over seven "fenths was produced in
the British colonies, and protectorates of Ceylon and
British Malaya. Nearly all the remainder was produced
in the Dutch East Indies: Java, Sumatra, and Borneo.
This concentration of supply was of vital importance in
the attempt to ccaitrcl the price of rubber.

PART THREE
Reports of the Stevenson CoHiiiiittee

First Report (a)
A, The Coffiinittee's terms of reference were:
"To investigate and report on the present rubber
situation in British Colonies and Protectorates, and to
advise what remedial measures should be taKen to iD:prove
the existing position,"
B, The Committee have had many suggestions and much in-
formation before them, including:
Reports of the Duncan Committee submitted to the
Government of the Straits Settlements and Federated
Malay States on January 26, 1921, and the Report dated
October 1, 1921 of the Commissions appointed by His
Excellency the Governor of the Straits Settlements and
High Commissioner of the Federated Malay States to inquire
into and report on:
1, The present state of trade depression
brought about mainly by the continued depression
in the Rubber Industry; and
2, The extension of credit facilities.
C, The Committee devoted their attention in the first place
to ascertaining the present state of the Rubber Industry.
In the absence of complete official statistical information,
(a) Vyliittlesey, Charles R., "Governmental Cont ro1 of Crude
Rubber", 1931, Appendix B p. 204
28

29
the Committee carefully Investigated the relevant statis-
tics from official and unofficial sources available, and
have concluded that the following figures of Plantation
and Wild Rubber may be taiten as showing approximately
the present position:
Table II
Actual Production of Crude Rubber in 1920-81 - Tons
Plantation Wild Total
1920 335,000 35,000 370,000
1921 260,000 22,000 282,000
The normal unrestricted output of Plantation
Rubber during 1922 is estimated at 380,000 tons, while
the production of Wild Rubber is estimated at 20,000 tons,
or 400,000 tons in all.
Table III
Annual V»orld Absorption 1919-1921 - Tons
1919
1920
1921
330,000
310,000
265,000
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In the present state of world trade it is not
possible to estimate the consumption of Crude Rubber in
1922 at more than the foregoing average, viz: 300,000 tons,
but some authorities place the probable consumption as low
as 260,000 tons.
Table IV
Total World Stocks of Crude Rubber - January 1, 1928
(estimated - tons)
In consuming countries 210,000
In producing countries 60,000
Afloat 40,000
310,000
This estimate of the total amoulit of Crude Rubber
in existence includes the invisible stocKS in the
hands of both producers and manufacturers. Necessary
stoGKs of Crude Rubber may be estimated at the equiv-
alent of eight months* consumption which on the fore-
going estimate for 1322 v^ould call for 200,000 tons.
On this basis the surplus stocits at January 1, 1922
amounted to 110,000 tons.
D. From these figures it appears that, in order to reduce
production of Plantation Rubber to the level of probable
consumption during 1922, a restriction to at least 75 per-
cent of normal would be required. The Committee was of
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the opinion, however, that the depression in the Industry-
could not be sufficiently rapidly relieved unless a sub-
stantial inroad was made into the existing surplus stocks
during 1922, and that a more drastic restriction is im-
perative to ensure this.
E, Of these figures, the Com/nittee cannot fail to advise
you to contemplate with grave concern the position of the
Industry in British Colonies and Protectorates, unless
steps are taken to reduce stocKS and, further, to prevent
over-production of rubber so long as the potential normal
production continues to be substantially in excess of
consiamption. They are of opinion that consumption is not
likely to overtake potential production for some years.
F. The Committee next directed their attention to the
manner in which the existing surplus could be reduced and
future supplies so regulated with a view to establishing
an equilibrium between supply and demand, and stabilizing
the Industry on a sound footing. They examined this problem
from four points of view:
1. Stimulation of new and extended uses of rubber
2. Voluntary restriction
3. The laissez-faire argument
4. Government action
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G, Yifith regard to (l.)> there is no doubt that much can
be done in the direction of stimulating new and extended
uses of rubber, but this cannot in itself, provide an
inunediate solution to the problem, since much time must
necessarily elapse before any new use can become sufficiently
operative to bring about materially increased consumption.
Further, it should be realized that improved methods of
manufacturing rubber products, such as tires, undoubtedly
prolong the life of the article and consequently curtail
the demand for raw rubber.
H. With regard to (2.), the Rubber Growers » Association,
which represents about 37 percent of the plantation
rubber-producing interests, secured the adhesion of nearly
all their members to a voluntary restriction of output to
75 percent of normal during the period November 1, 1920 to
December 31, 1921, During December last, they endeavored
to secure the assent of their members to continue voluntary
restriction by undertaking not to produce more rubber during
the first six months of 1922 than they produced during the
corresponding period of 1921, or alternatively, than 75
percent of their output during the corresponding period of
1920. The Council of the Association was able to secure
the assent of only 55 percent of the producing interests
represented by members of the Association, as compared with
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the minimum of 70 percent deemed necessary to make the
scheme operative. Notwithstanding this, it is evident
that the necessity for continuing to restrict output is
appreciated by a large proportion of the members of the
Association, who will no doubt, continue this policy on
an independent voluntary basis.
I. With regard to (3.), the advocates of the laissez-
faire policy desire to see a survival of the fittest.
They rely on being themselves among the survivors, and
disregard entirely the hardships which must fall on the
many tens of thousands of shareholders in this country
alone, and the many thousands of European and Asiatic
owners and shareholders resident in the countries of pro-
duction, if the Industry is to drift along unprofitably
until the weakest have been eliminated. It must be borne
in mind that even though a proportion of existing proprietors
are forced to abandon their estates, the rubber trees thereon
will remain a potential source of rubber and will be brought
into production 5g ain by someone as soon as a margin of profit
can be secured. The Committee could not, therefore, advise
you to leave things in their present unsatisfactory state,
unless all efforts to find a positive solution of the problem
fail.
J. With regard to (4.), the Committee are fully aware of the
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grave objections to Government interference with industry,
especially when it takes the forrL of restricting the output
of an important raw material. The objections are obvious
to all and need not be set out in detail. It was only with
reluctance and with a lively apprehension of the dangers
which threaten both the Industry and the countries in which
it is so largely carried on that the Committee agreed to
consider a measure of compulsory restriction as an alterna-
tive to what seemed to be v/orse evils.
K, Further, the Comihittee desire to put on record that at
the outset of their inquiry, they found and have never de-
parted from, the conviction that it was impossible to deal
with the problem as one affecting only the British Colonies
and Dependencies in which rubber is produced. They recog-
nized from the first that no scheme of restriction, whether
voluntary or compulsory, could usefully be applied in Jialaya
unless it was simultaneously applied in other countries in
which there is production of rubber on a large scale. This
conviction formed the basis of the Conmiittee's deliberations,
and in particular, they have throughout kept in view the fact
that no scheme, however excellent in itself, could properly
be recommeded to you for adoption unless it commended itself
to the Authorities of the Dutch East Indies, who control the
only important source of Plantation Rubber outside British
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Colonies and Dependencies.
Table V
Relative Iiriportance of Different Plantation
Rubber Producing Countries
(approximate)
L. The Committee had numerous schemes before them involving
Government action, but as several had fundamental objections
it is not proposed to refer to them all in this Report.
Two schemes, however, appeared to offer a practicable solu-
tion to the problem, and are briefly described:
Scheme (l) is that suggested by the Duncan Committee
in their Report of January 1921, and involves legislation
prohibiting both the production and export of any quantity
of rubber in excess of a prescribed percentage of that
produced or exported during a specified previous period.
Scheme (2) was proposed by the Chairman, and comprises
Percentage of
Total Production
Malaya
Ceylon
South India and Burma
Netherlands East Indies
Other Countries
57.5
18.5
2.0
25.5
2.5
100.0
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a graduated scale of export duties, varying with
the percentage of standard production (i.e., output
during a specified previous period) exported; a low
duty being fixed on the amount exported within a
permissible percentage and prohibitive duties being
fixed if more than the permissible standard production
be exported.
The outlines of these two schemes are as follows:
Scheme 1:
(a) Adopts, as the standard production, the
actual output of each producer during the
twelve months, November 1919 to October 1920
estimated to agrigate 330,000 tons of Plant-
ation Rubber from all producing countries;
(b) Restricts to a percentage of the standard
production, leaving a margin of production
available to meet forward contracts or cases
of special hardship; such percentage being
fixed from time to time by notification in
the Government Gazette;
(c) Sets out draft enactment and rules to
carry the scheme into effect.
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Scheme 2
"Standard Production" v/ould be the same as
in Scheme 1, plus the scale of duties pro-
posed in the following table:
Table VI
Scale of Duties Proposed Under Scheme 2
Percentage of Standard Subject to Duty
Production Exported per Pound Over All
Over 100 1 s. 8 d.
91 to 100 1 0
81 to 90 0 10
76 to 80 0 8
71 to 75 0 9
66 to 70 0 4
61 to 65 0 2
60 and under 0 1
Of these rates of duty. 1 penny per pound
,
irrespective of the price <of rubber or quantity
exported, would be imposed permanently in lieu
of the existing ad valorem duty, but rates in
excess of 1 penny would be temporarily imposed
,
say for three years , VnTien the rubber situation
improved so as to justify an increased percentage
of standard production being exported, the nec-
essary elasticity would be secured by fixing the
minimum rate of 1 penny just below the increased
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percentage required; thus if export of 70 per-
cent instead of 60 percent could be absorbed,
the duty on export of 70 percent and under
would be fixed at 1 penny, duty on 71 percent
and over remaining as in the scale,
M. It will be seen that the essential differences between
the two schemes are that the first prohibits output over
a fixed percentage and secures no revenue to the State,
while the second would have the tendency to restrict exports
over a fixed percentage, but not directly production, would
bring in a revenue to the State from duty, and should not
prove difficult to administer,
N. The Committee regarded Scheme 8 as the preferable of the
two and easily workable. If adopted, the percentage of
standard production to be allowed during the tv/elve months
following the introduction of the scheme should be fixed
at 60 percent, which, with the margin to read forward con-
tracts or cases of special hardship by reason of the period
selected for the standard, would ensure a substantial dim-
inution of the surplus stocK of Crude Rubber. Alterations
in the percentage of standard production should be governed
by the price of standard quality Smoked Sheet in the London
Market, and it was proposed that when the price for such
rubber had been maintained at not less than 1 shilling 3
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pence per pound London landed terms, during the whole
of three consecutive months, the percentage of production
which may be exported at the mininium duty should be raised
automatically by 5 for the next ensuing quarter. At the
end of every quarter a similar adjustment, either upwards
or downwards, in the permissible percentage exported at
the minimum rate of duty would automatically taKe place,
but the percentage would not fall below 60 percent.
In arriving at this formula the Committee had
most prominently in view the desirability of taking no
steps which would be liable to prejudice the legitimate
development and expansion of the uses of rubber. A policy
of restriction can only be a temporary palliative, but,
in fixing the price which shall govern the alterations in
the percentage of standard production exported at the min-
imum rate of duty, the Committee arrived at what they be-
lieved to be a figure which would ensure a satisfactory
margin of profit, notwithstanding the somewhat higher cost
of a restricted crop. At the same time, the manufacturers
of rubber goods should be able to obtain their supplies of
crude rubber at a reasonable price with much less risk of
the violent fluctuations which have been such a drawback
in the past, and should thus have every encouragement to
develop new uses for rubber, many of which have already
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been suggested and are only awaiting practical exploitation
on a substantial scale.
0, The minimuiD rate of export duty allowed in the sc^'^le is
approximately twice the amount now payable in Ceylon and in
the Federated Malay States at the price indicated, and the
Comii.ittee contemplated that increases only because the work-
ing of the scheme may involve some additional expense on the
part of government in administering it. They are of the
opinion that a substantial proportion of any additional rev-
enue obtained under the scheme should be specifically set
aside and applied for the direct benefit of the plantation
rubber industry in such ways as Scientific Research and the
development of new uses for rubber.
P. Having reached a tentative agreement to submit the two
schemes, the Committee, being convinced that it was essential
that any policy of restriction, if it is to be effective, and
not to injure one producing country to the advantage of others,
must be applied simultaneously in all the chief producing
countries, viz: Malaya, Netherlands East Indies, and Ceylon,
considered it advisable that steps should be taken to have
their schemes submitted to the proper authorities in those
countries
.
Q. Until the attitude of the Dutch is definitely known the
Committee are unable to carry their inquiry further, as they
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can not recoimnend the adoption of either of the proposed
schemes by only one or more British Colony or Protectorate.
In view of the present disparity between probable
demand and potential production, and the large surplus
stocks which exist, the immediate outlook of the Rubber
Industry is a serious one, but the Corimiittee desire to
Record their unamimous conviction that stabilization on
a sound basis can be secured by friendly cooperation among
the principal producing countries. So strongly do the
Committee believe this to be the case that they consider
the Governments concerned would be well advised actively
to encourage such cooperation, and they trust that you may
consider it worth while, in the light of this report, to
cause further representations to be made to the Dutch Govern-
ment on the subject, with a view to holding an International
Conference in London of the principal interests concerned.

Supplementary Report of the Stevenson Committee (b)
A. Since the Committee »s last report was issued, the
reply of the Netherlands* Government to the proposals for
cooperation with His Majesty »s Government in legislature
to ameliorate the situation in the industry has been
received.
The Netherlands' Government hss decided not to take
at present any legislative measures to restrict the produc-
tion of rubber in the Netherlands.
B. The Committee have considered the question of whether in
these circumstances a policy of restrictive measures in
British Colonies and Protectorates alone cculd be adopted to
the advantage of the British rubber industry, and in this
consideration they have been influenced by the following
facts
:
1, Excessive and increasing production of rubber
owing to the failure of the producers to make
voluntary restriction effective with the consequent
continuation of the depression in the price of
rubber
.
2. The general demand by the leaders of the rubber
industry both in London and in fcialaya for restrictive
(b) Vvhittlesey, Charles R,, "Governmental Control of Crude
Rubber", 1931, Appendix B p. 204
4S
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measures if necessary by one or more of the British
Dependencies independently of the Netherlands' Gov-
ernment attitude,
3. The Committee have had before them the latest
available estimates as to the figures of the world's
production and absorption of rubber in 1922, to-
gether with figures of exsisting stocks.
C, Notwithstanding the fact that the rate of the world's
absorption of rubber for the present year shows a substan-
tial increase on the Committee's previous figure of 300,
000 tons, they have decided to base their recommendations
on the figure of absorption mentioned in their previous
report, in order that they may err on the safe side,
D, The Cofiimittee have closely investigated the effects of
the introduction in British Colonies and Protectorates of
legislation framed to bring about more stable conditions
in the industry even v/ithout government control over pro-
duction in other territories,
E, Inquiries have been made as to the possibility of secur-
ing voluntary restriction of tapping on British estates
situated in such other territories in association with any
restrictive measures that might be taken in the territories
of the British Empire; the Committee understand that the
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Rubber Growers* Association have obtained the assurance
of cooperation in this sense from the majority of these
estates. This support v/ill proportionately reduce the
restriction in British territories necessary to effect
a readjustment of supply to demand.
F. In view of these considerations and the predominating
interest in the rubber industry held by British producers,
the Committee have felt a revision of their previous atti-
tude to be justified, and they accordingly desire to recom-
mend that a scheme of government intervention should be put
into operation in Ceylon, the Malay States, and the Straits
Settlements as soon as possible.
The scheme which they recommend is practically that
of Scheme 2 in their previous report, with certain amend-
ments.
RECOMJIENDATIONS
1, The scheme recommended adopts as the standard
production the actual output of each producer
during the twelve months - November 1, 1919 to
October 31, 1920 - amplified in accordance with
the suggested Rules
2, In lieu of existing Export Duties, a minimum
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export duty is to be levied on that percentage
of standard production which is allowed to be
exported under this scheme at the minimum rate
of duty. The CoroLiittee recommend that this
minimuEi be fixed at the lowest possible rate
not to exceed 1 penny per pound.
If a producer desires to export a quantity
greater than that allowed to be exported at the
minimum rate of duty, he shall pay an export
duty on his total export during that period of
twelve months on the scale given in the table
below:
Table VII
Export Duties on Total Export Over That Allowed
at Minimum Rate
Percentage of Standard Duty per
Production Exported Pound Over
100 1 s. 0 d.
Over 95 to 100 0 11
" 90 " 95 0 10
" 85 " 90 0 9
" 80 " 85 0 8
IT 75 n 80 0 7
n 70 " 75 0 6
" 65 " 70 0 5
" 60 " 65 0 4
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At the initiation of the scheme the percentage
exportable at the mininjum rate is to be 60.
\Ti'hen the rubber situation improves so as to
Justify allowing an increased percentage of standard
production to be exported at the minimum rate of
duty the minimum would be substituted in its appro-
priate place in the scale.
3. Alterations in the percentage of standard
production would be governed by the price of stand-
ard quality Smoked Sheet in the London t^arket, and
it is proposed that, v/hen the average price for
such rubber during three consecutive months has
been maintained at not less than 1 shilling and 3
pence per pound, London landed terms, the percentage
of production which may be exported at the minimum
duty would be raised automatically by 5 for the
next ensuing quarter. In the event of such average
price being maintained at not less than 1 shilling
and 6 pence per pound, London landed terms, during
the whole three consecutive months, the percentage
of production which may be exported at the minimum
duty would be raised automatically by 10 for the
next ensuing quarter.
4. Furthermore, in order that the operation of the
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scheme may secure the desired result, even though
for reasons at present unforeseen 60 percent of
standard production should prove too high, the
Committee recommended that if during the second
quarter after the initiation of the scheme or in
any subsequent period of three consecutive months,
the price of rubber as hereinfore defined, has not
averaged at least 1 shilling per pound, the percen-
tage of standard production that may be exported
at the minimum duty shall be reduced to 55, and if
that reduction is not effective in raising the
average price, over the following quarter to 1 shil-
ling and 3 pence, then it shall be reduced to 50 at
the end of the three months, and so on by reductions
of 5 percent at the end of each quarter until that
average price is secured.
Once the percentage has been lowered it would
not be increased except on the basis of a price of
1 shilling and 3 pence as aforementioned. If during
any quarter when the percentage of standard produc-
tion that may be exported at the minimum of duty is
for the time being fixed at not under 65 percent
and the price during that quarter has not averaged
at least 1 shilling and 3 pence per pound, the per-
centage for the ensuing quarter would be reduced by
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5. The application of the scheme in their several
territories would rest with the local governments
concerned.
6. The Conaijittee recojmended that an Advisory
Comrnittee be appointed in London for the purposes
of coordinating the operation of the scheme in
Ceylon, Malaya, and such other territories as may
be involved. They suggest that this Committee
should consist of official and non-official members
whose duty would be to advise the Secretary of State
on all matters referred to it in connection with the
operation of the policy now recommended, and that
it should be charged with the responsibility of
advising him as to the alterations in the rate of
minimum duty required under the scheme.
7. The Committee recommend that the governments
of the territories concerned should set up Committees
on which there should be representatives of the
industry to deal with cases for special consideration
in regard to local application of the scheme, and the
Committee annex to this Report rules that would re-
quire to be observed by these local Committees in the
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administration of the scheme,
8. The CoBiBilttee cannot conclude this Report
without observing that, apart frcxn the financial
relief that may be expected to accrue to all
rubber producers from the scheme, the discourage-
ment it affords to more drastic tapping cannot but
benefit the estates of those managements v/ho are
voluntarily or compulsorily associated with the
scheme and leave them ultimately in a stronger
position than the estates whose trees have been
subjected to tapping on an excessive scale.

Table VIII
Statistics of Operation of Restriction Plan
Period
Exportable Price
Percentage ^-Ib.
Production Cons-umption
World Restricted Y/orld
(OOO-tons) (000-tons)
First Year
Nov.l, »22-Jan.31, »23
Feb.l,»23-Apr.30,»23
May 1, » 23-Jul, 31, » 23
Aug.l, »23-0ct.31, »23
Second Year
Nov.l, »23-Jan. 31, »24
Feb.l, »24-Apr.30, »24
May 1, '24-Jul, 31, » 24
Aug.l, »24-0ct.31, »24
Third Year
Nov.l, »24-Jan.31, '25
Feb.l,'25-Apr.30, '25
May 1, »25-Jul.31, '25
Aug.l, '25-Oct. 31, '25
Fourth Year
Nov.l,'25-Jan.31, '26
Feb.l, »26-Apr,30, '26
May 1,'26-Jul.31, '26
Aug.l, '26-0ct.31, »26
Fifth Year
Nov.l,'26-Jan.31,'27
Feb.l, '27-Apr.30, '27
May 1,'27-Jul.31,'27
Aug.l, '27-0ct,31, '27
Sixth Year
Nov.l, '27-Jan. 31, '28
Feb.l, '28-Apr.30, '28
May 1, '28-Jul.31, '28
Aug.l, '28-Oct. 31, «28
60 28. i;60
65 27.3 ) 412.7 240.9 439.4
60
60 26.6;
7(CiO » ( .
60 19.9.) 421.2 209.4 458.2
O .
50 36.3;
RR
65 79.5 1 516.0 268.0 551.2
7S
85 93.5;
100 R7 1 1
100 44.2 1 614.7 344.0 533.9
100 40 71
fiO 39 1
1
70 40. 0)
60 37.6]1 605.1 298.0 589.1
60 34.4)
60 39.6)
60 26.1)
60 19.1) 649.6 354.7 667.0
60 18. 7)
(c) Whittlesey, Charles R., "Governmental Control of Crude Rubber",
1931, p. 33
(d) Average spot price in N.Y. for quarter from Standard Statistics
Co., Statistical Section, Base Book, 1930-31
(e) Rickinson, W.H,, & Son, London, "World's Rubber Position",
1924 - May 1932
50
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PART FOUR
Effect on Producers, Consumers, and Investors

Effect on Producers
Condition of Plantations
'Alien the act was passed in 1922 the plantations
were in a run down condition. Many of the planters
resorted to overtapping in an effort to reduce unit costs.
Others had tapped their trees heavily so as to maintain
the same purchasing power despite reduced prices of rubber.
Expenditures were lowered to avoid operation at a loss.
Although these savings were effective in lowering immediate
costs they involved neglect of soil, drainage, weeding, and
buildings. Still prices obtained did not cover cost of
maintenance. Planters having small holdings allowed their
rubber groves to grow up in weeds and jungle because it was
more profitable. Abandonments, although not great in extent
did occur. The immediate effect of restriction strengthened
by an increased demand was a rise in price making it possible
for most of the planters to make a profit for the ensuing
period and to put the plantations into a better condition,
More attention was given to drainage, soil wash, cultivation,
weeding, and care and prevention of disease among trees. (a)
By limiting the amount of rubber that estates could sell
the Stevenson Act compelled the planters in tialaya and
Ceylon to give their trees a much needed rest. This helped
(a) "Yearbook of the Department of Agriculture", Ceylon,
1924, p. 2
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to revitalize old trees and safeguarded the strength of
yo\mg trees just coming into bearing. The less severe
tapping methods eniployed and the resulting conservation
of bark were of distinct advantage from the standpoint of
the general wellbeing of the plantations.
On small holdings and holdings so situated that
they could not hope to produce their assessed standard
production there was considerable overtapping by reason
of the higher prices offered, (b) The fault in such cases
lay in improper assessment of standard production and was
inevitable in view of the haste with which restriction was
imposed. In other instances owners of good holdings leased
additional holdings tapping only the leased holdings while
resting his own and thus obtained the full amount of rubber
for export allov/ed on all holdings. Such abuses were not
coirurion however. More conservative tapping methods were
effected and generally retained even during high prices so
that during 1924 there was a marked reduction in the extent
of stem and root diseases.
Effect of High Prices, 19S5-26
High prices and the larger exportable allowances
resulting provided the necessary incentive to bring aban-
(b) Excessive tapping, as much' as twice a day, combined
with the use of a ladder to give greater access to tappable
bark is most common on small holdings in flat areas near
the coast where growing conditions are not so suitable.
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doned estates into use. Other holdings, particularly
those of the natives in more remote districts were also
cleared and better cultivated as a result.
The fertilizing of estates, which stimulate growth
and ability to resist disease, the introduction of machinery,
a greater bud grafting developed, and a Rubber Research In-
stitute was established as a result of this prosperity in
the rubber industry at this time.
There is little evidence that high prices of rubber
had affected the character or severity of tapping of native
holdings. Although as the quota increased it became neces-
sary to remove more bark in order to obtain greater quanti-
ties of rubber, with the exception of a few cases where
farming out of holdings on a profit sharing basis led to a
draining of the trees, excessive tapping was very rare, (c)
The average standard of tapping was far superior than had
been in previous years. Improvements in tapping methods
made it possible to increase yields without injury to trees.
It had been alleged by the British that Dutch estates
badly overtapped their trees follov/ing restriction. This
was not general and the condition of Dutch estates was de-
clared excellent while costs were greatly reduced.
(c) Excessive tapping occurs when a tree is tapped so fre-
quently or over so large a circumference as to lower its
vitality or to prevent bark renewal from keeping pace with
bark consumption.
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The Removal of Restriction in 1928
Vvith the removal of restriction some laxness in
the care of the trees reappeared but this wss confined to
smaller holdings. Furthermore, the government was better
able to cope with such abuses than had been the case in
1922. The net result of restriction from the standpoint
of the plantations was a definite improvement in their
physical as well as in their financial condition.
Effect on Cost of Production in Restricted Areas
The way in which all-in costs of British rubber
companies in restricted and in unrestricted regions were
affected by restriction appears from the figures in the
following table:
Table IX (d)
All-in Costs of Rubber Companies
Restricted Countries 1922-23 1923-24
140 Malayan Companies
28 Ceylon Companies
8.68 d
7.60
9.68 d
9.20
Unrestricted Countires
23 D.E.I. Companies
20 Plantation Companies
9.22
9.07
9.13
8.46
(d) "Harvard Business Review", July 1926, p. 858
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It is seen from the foregoing figures that following
restriction costs of the coinpanies in restricted countries
increased ll| percent and 18^ percent v/hile costs of
companies in unrestricted areas decreased by 1 percent and
6 percent. The difference in the movement of costs of
coKpanies in Malaya and Ceylon and elsewhere is explained
by the fact that, v/hile many of the British estates in
\mrestricted regions followed restriction voluntarily, most
of them did not to the same extent and some did not restrict
at all. The primary cause of this tendency toward increased
cost of production for the individual plantation lay in the
fact that while certain of the costs wereieduced with the
decreased output others were not, and thus the average unit
cost per pound was increased.
A general criticism of the Stevenson Plan is that it
tended to reduce the profits of the most efficient estates
relatively more than those of the estates having a lower
yield per acre. Until the modifications made in 1985 no
consideration was given to the ability of some estates to
produce more than 400 pounds per acre so that the more
efficient plantations were restricted to less than the de-
clared export allowance of their true potential output.
Furthermore, plantations, that would have been squeezed
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out except for this plan were the least efficient producers.
Their elimination would have left the surviving plantations
in a stronger position than before the passage of the Act
and in a stronger position than they now occupy, because
restriction supported the weak along with the strong.
In the case of the Dutch estates in unrestricted
areas, by encouraging a high output, overhead costs per unit
of product were reduced without giving rise to extravagance.
Effect on Labor
Both of the key industries of British Malaya, tin
and rubber, are aljoiost entirely dependent upon immigrant
labor. Immigrant labor is also important in Ceylon. Java,
however, shows considerable diversification in products
and has a very large domestic labor supply, although there
is considerable movements of immigrants from China. The
situation in Sumatra resembles that of Lialaya.
In the Netherlands East Indies the system of Penal
Sanction still prevails by which the support of the govern-
ment is given to the enforcement of labor contracts by mak-
ing it a criminal offense for the worker to quit the employer
who hired him. In Malaya the immigrant enters the country
a free agent even though all the expenses of recruiting

59
and transportating him may have been borne by the planters.
Wages in the middle east follov/ed the tendency in
other parts of the world and rose during the war considerably
above their pre-war level. The rise was greatest in trading
centers such as Singapore and in regions devoted to the pro-
duction of commodities most affected by war conditions as in
Banka where the great staple is tin.
The net result of the period of low prices, 1920-SS
was that the reduced demand for labor made it possible to
readjust wages on a pre-war basis and that large numbers
of coolies were forced out of tne country so that when
compulsory restriction was enacted labor was not released
to any great extent. The rubber growers agreed as early
as 1981 that when price improved tapping would not be in-
creased so rapidly as to force wages up again. Similar
agreements were made at later times.
In the Dutch East Indies wages were also lov/ered
and additional steps taKen to relieve the situation. One
was the placing of public lands at the disposal of dis-
charged contract laborers in order to encourage them to
remain in the country as colonists. It was also ruled
that workers employed under the Penal Sanction could be
changed from one plantation to another in order to provide
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work for as many as possible.
For seven months following the passage of the
Stevenson Act the immigration into British Malaya was much
below normal. In part this was due to the introduction of
restriction but a more important reason was the uncertainty
arising from the passage of the Indian Emmigration Act, the
effect of which was so doubtful as to discourage recruiting
for a time. Immigration into the middle east is influenced
by a variety of factors. Political conditions in China are
important and were partially responsible for the decline in
immigration during the early months of restriction. In
India recruiting is affected by crops, prospects of local
employment, and in this instance it was affected by the
damage done to Malayans reputation, in consequence of the
slump, as a good wage earning country.
Effect on the Standard of Living of Natives
The increased prosperity that followed the improve-
ment in the rubber situation naturally affected the con-
dition of the mass of the population. This was most notice-
able during 1925-26 when rubber prices were at their peak,
though in both restricted and unrestricted areas the im-
provement dates from the beginning of restriction. The
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most spectacular evidence of the influence of the prosperity
in the rubber industry upon the native's standard of living
was in his expenditures for articles consumed. The natives
with their newly acquired wealth were reported to be crowd-
ing the shops, buying freely for themselves and their fami-
lies. Natives coming to town with their unaccustomed wealth
turned to the purchase of fine clothing, jewelry, notions,
trinicets, musical instruments and a great variety of things
they had always been forced to do without, except for a
brief period during the war, because of their lack of money.
On the whole, the natives were not as spendthrift as
was alleged and they seem to have been careful to provide
for their more prudent wants before they turned to their
more extravagant, with the result that the end of the period
of boom prices found them better fed, better clothed, and
better housed than they had been before.
The Output of Rubber Under the Stevenson Act
Restricted Areas
It is improbable that the full assessed standard
production would have been produced even if restriction had
not prevented so large an output. There is no indication
to show that prices would have risen as and when they did if
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it had not been for restriction, although the ultimate
rise might have been as great. A continuance of low
prices for some time would, therefore, have been almost
inevitable in view of the large stocks on hand, since the
actual rise follov*ing restriction seems to have been
largely due to psychological factors. Under existing low
prices abandonment of plantations and reduction of tapping
would have made the realization of the so-called standard
production impossible.
The figures for 1926 when production was only slightly
restricted indicate that throughout the intervening period
the amount that could have been produced on existing planta-
tions had been considerably in excess of demand at prevailing
prices. It is likely that without restriction prices would
have remained low for some time and production would have
eventually been checked.
One definite effect of restriction upon production
in the restricted countries may be mentioned. As a result
of being on a restricbBd output for a considerable length of
time most of the estates found it impossible to expand their
production as rapidly as increases in the quarterly allowances
in 1925-26 permitted. The principal limiting factor was
labor. Certain of the estates had sufficient labor because
they had been maintaining forces somewhat in excess of their
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requirements but in general the labor supply had been
kept below capacity requirements so that they found it
impossible to expand productiorj rapidly. In other cases
reserve stocks had been accumulated making it possible
for them to export their full quotas and so to take ad-
vantage of the high prices prevailing. As a result of
the general situation there was a piling up of considerable
quantities of unused export rights which became a serious
problem later v/hen the question of reductions in the ex-
portable percentage again rose, Ceylon, in fact, failed
by 12 percent to export the quantity authorized during the
year 1S26,
V/ith the removal of restriction a flood of rubber
was released, exports from British Malaya in November and
December 1928 being nearly double the highest monthly rate
previously. This was mainly due to the face that many
planters, particularly the proprietors of small holdings,
had accuieulated considerable stocks of rubber in anticipa-
tion of the repeal of the Act, Therefore, while the export
of rubber was restricted accordin-g to the provisions of the
law up to the very day of its repeal, it had ceased to con-
trol the production of rubber on plantations some time be-
fore.
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Unrestricted Areas
Production in the Netherlands East Indies expanded
greatly following restriction. This has often beoi assumed
to have been entirely the result of restriction, but virtu-
ally all of this increased volume of rubber v/as obtained
from trees plejited from five to seven years before. As the
Netherlands Indies were much less affected by the war than
was British Malaya a great deal of planting occuned at that
time which was just coming into bearing in the years immedi-
ately following restriction. Much of the increased output
would, therefore, have occurred without restriction, though
it is likely that, in the absence of the restrictive legi-
slation, abandonments and temporary cessation of tapping in
consequence of lower prices would have prevented some of
this rubber from entering the market. On the other hand,
this would have been partially offset by production from
British and other planters in unrestricted areas who follow-
ed Malaya and Ceylon in restricting.
The outstanding feature of the expansion of production
in the Dutch East Indies was the very unexpected growth in
the output of native rubber. The increased from 1920 to
1926 inclusive was elevenfold. In 1920 native rubber from
the Netherlands Indies was less than 3 percent of the total
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world production and in 1926 was 14 percent of the total.
Contrary to predictions, native rubber production
seeras to have assumed a considerable degree of permanence
and to be subject to no very great changes with declines
in price.
The production of rubber in the Netherlands Indies
was also increased by rubber smuggled out of the restricted
countries and unloaded in the unrestricted areas. The
volume of such smuggled rubber was large at times. The
fact that the export of rubber from Dutch ports increased
only slightly during 1926 was in part explained by the
reduction of smuggling from Malaya following the raising of
the exportable allowance to 100 percent.
The volume of rubber produced in other unrestricted
countries in the middle east, French Indo-China, India, and
Burma was relatively slight.
The increase in the production of guayule rubber
following restriction was marked. This increase came partly
from, plants growing wild in Mexico and partly from plantings
left unharvested because of the low prevailing prices during
the slump years.
The prod-uction of wild rubber in Africa and in Brazil
and other parts of Central and South America w^^s not greatly
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affected by the higher prices prevailing under restriction.
The supply of wild rubber is not elastic and reacts slowly
to changes in price. The econoLiic and political status of
the natives in the regions producing wild rubber has chang-
ed considerably since the tiite when wild rubber dominated
the market, the days when every ton of rubber v/as said to
represent human life. The more accessible trees have been
destroyed so increasing both the cost of securing rubber
and the time required for harvesting it.
Quality of Rubber Produced
One of the first effects of restriction was to make
buyers less particular as to the precise quality of rubber
purchased, Vvith the high prices of 19S5 a definite increase
in the impurities contained in rubber imported to British
Malaya for reconditioning was observed. Adulteration was
particularly common among native producers in Dutch Borneo
and other parts of the Dutch East Indies in spite of laws
forbidding it. As a result of more careful inspection of
rubber shipped out and the sentencing of offenders to
prison some improvement was brought about, but the quality
of native rubber remains distinctly inferior to that of
estate rubber.
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Table X
Net Exports of Crude Rubber 1910-1930 (e)
(000 tons)
(As Estimated by the Rubber Growers* Association)
Wild Plantation
Year South Other Total British Neth. Ceylon Other Total Total
Amer. v/ild wild Malaya East Plant wild h
Indies -at ion Plsnt-
atlon
1910 44 39 85 6.5 2.4 1.6 . \J 11 94
1915 40 11 51 70.2 20. 20.8 4.6 115.6 166.6
1920 50 7 57 181. 80. 39.0 16.6 316.6 355.6
1925 28 11 59 210. 189. 45.7 54.8 479.5 518.5
1929 21. 1 4.9 26 455.5 255.5 80.3 44.2 835.5 861.5
1950 14. 5 4.2 18 4442.7 241. 75.6 40.1 799.4 817.8
Planting
The improvement in price served to stimulate nev/
planting in both restricted and unrestricted areas though
the increase was somewhat greater and more immediate in the
Netherlands East Indies than in restricted countries and
among native planters than among estate planters.
The possibility of native rubber replacing estate
rubber has come to be regarded as distinctly probable,
since even before the war it was increasing faster than
(e) Row, J.W.F., "Studies in Artificial Control of Raw
Material Supplies", No. 2 Rubber, April 1951, p. 83.
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European rubber. The native producer is free frocj vexing
labor problems; he is not obliged to maintain a large and
expensive organization with high overhear]; his taxes are
less; he has no sick benefits or bonuses to pay; and ordi-
narily, his expenditures for labor are very alight as his
whole family works. A further advantage is the facility
with vifhich he can turn from rubber to rice or some other
crop and so maintain himself when prices drop. This ex-
plains why native planting expanded more rapidly, (f)
In view of these considerations it is expected that
European owned and managed rubber estates in the Nether-
lands East Indies will be a curiosity.
Planting in Restricted Areas
Since the planting that occurred after the passage
of the Stevenson Act resulted in a situation of potential
overproduction, it is seen that restriction could have
been made effective over an extended period of time only
by controlling planting as well as actual output. The
tendency of high prices is to stimulate planting and
eventually to increase the volume of rubber offered for
sale, but restriction can only operate to bring about high
prices by holding down the amount of rubber supplied to the
(f ) The native planter here referred to is the holder of a
few acres only.
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market. Therefore, in order for restriction to be effective
the extension of planting must be liniited.
Planting in Unrestricted Areas
Since growers in the Netherlands Indies were on full
production their financial position me-de planting operations
feasible. Thus while the new planting in the Dutch East
Indies following restriction was not extremely large it w?s
greater than that undertaken in the restricted countries with
the high prices of 1925-26 heavy planting was begun. The
lower prices of 1927 failed to check planting materially and
with the New York price between 35 cents and 40 cents full
planting would continue.

Attitude of the American Consuiuers
Shortly after the Stevenson Act was proposed the
Rubber Association of America, representing 85 percent of
the output of rubber goods in this country, appointed a
committee to deal with the situation. The attitude of the
Americans was that restriction was economically unsound,
in principle, that it was unnecessary and that the situation
was correcting itself^ also, that it lacked flexibility and
therefore might interfere with the growth of the industry,
promote a speculative market, and place a heavy burden on
the industry and on the American people.
The Americans requested first, the repeal of restric-
tion and second, for such flexibility as would prevent undue
hardship to the consumers, or finally, for official assurance
that in case of a runaway market the discretionary power of
the British government would be exercised to ease the situa-
tion. Such assurance was never given but it was declared
that if the predicted condition of market stringency did
come about the government would take necessary steps to meet
the situation. American manufacturers in general accepted
the view that they had nothing to fear from restriction and,
persuaded that restriction was necessary to save the industry,
settled down to a period of stable prices.
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One outstanding exception to this was Harvey £.
Firestone. So violently did he oppose the conciliatory
attitude of the Rubber Association of America, of v/hich
he had been president, that he withdrew froiK the organiza-
tion. He called a meeting of protest against restriction
which was attended by a considerable nuiriber of smaller
manufacturers. Firestone backed his opinion with an active
propaganda, program in addition to undertaking extensive
planting operations of his own.
The attitude of the United States government was one
of opposition from the start. It v/as declared that aside
from the commercial aspects of the question the government
was vitally interested because of the importance of the
commodity in warfare. Because of the localization of the
supply in the middle east where it could be subjected to
the control of any large pov/er in tin.e of war the govern-
ment called attention to the desirability of planting in
other parts of the world, (g)
The American manufacturers allowed stocks of crude
rubber to diminish during 1923 and 1924 until the end of
that year found them short. Buyers began to suspect that
they had been too optimistic and began to buy in a rising
ffjarket. At this point, in the spring of 1925, the Rubber
(g) vVhittlesey, Charles, R. "Governmental Control of Crude
Rubber", 1931, p. 137 This is not an argument against
restriction but against undue localization.
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Association of America cabled to the Rubber Growers*
Association requesting that they use their influence to
the end that the government exercise its power and allow
sufficient releases of rubber to checii the rise in prices,
in accordance v/ith the assurances given two years before.
All responsibility was disclainied by the British and they
countered by ascribing the blame for the rubber shortage
to the Americans, Partly because of the feeling that they
had been"sold out" by the British and partly because of the
high prices the manufacturers became definitely hostile to-
ward restriction and joined against it.
An investigation undertaken in 1926 showed that in
general the Americans considered themselves the aggrieved
party but there were some who felt that the British had as
much a right to levy their export duty as we to levy our
import duties.
Fluctuations in price during 1927 were less than in
any other year and this did much to reassure manufacturers
with respect to restriction. They take the attitude that,
v;ithin reasonable limits, they do not care how high prices
are so long as they are stable, (h) The level of prices
(h) Very high prices are d-^ngerous to the manufacturer even
aside from the effect on consumption of the finished product.
With the price of crude rubber at tl.OO per pound a 25 percent
decline would mean a loss of 25 cents per pound on inventories
while at 20 cents per pound a 25 percent decline would mean
only a loss of 5 cents per pound.
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was not unduly high as compared with forriier levels so that
the consuming public, buying tires for less than ever before,
was also inclined to be satisfied. Active opposition to
restriction therefore, largely died away at this time.
The attitude which was first one of trustfulness,
then of injury and violent opposition, became watchful
skepticism. Therefore when restriction was abandoned there
was a general feeling of relief.
VvTiat Was Done by American Consumers
A campaign for economy conducted by the Department
of Commerce was undertaken. Consumers of rubber products
were urged to secure greater use from the goods. Tire
tests were made and literature was issued telling hov/ to
care for tires. The use of repair materials was urged.
The tire manufacturers themselves joined in this program
although it meant reduced sales.
Too much weight cannot be given to the purely
domestic activities of the Department of Commerce. It is
of greater significance that the tire replacement per car
during 1986 was 1.98, the lowest ever recorded, (i)
(i) Hymans, Xraay, "Rubber Facts, Figures, Forecasts", 1927
London, p. 18 ...."sales of automobile casings for replace-
ment purposes were 4,333,000 lower than for the preceding
fiscal year, a decrease of 16.6 percent, and sales of inner
tubes were lower by 8,710,000, or 32.6 percent.
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The consumption of crude rubber showed a decrease
of nearly 7 percent in 1926 as compared with 1925. (j)
This is especially noteworthy in view of the fact that the
registration of automobiles and trucks was 10 percent higher
and gasoline consumption 17 percent higher.
Table XI
Automobile Registration, United States (k)
1920 - 1928
Passenger Cars Trucks
1920 8,225,859 1,006,082
1921 9,346,195 1,118,520
1922 10,864,128 1,375,725
1923 13,479,608 1,612,569
1924 15,460,649 2,134,724
1925 17,512,638 2,441,709
1926 19,237,171 2,764,222
1927 20,219,224 2,914,019
1928 21,379,125 3,113,999
The economy program was also directed toward the
These figures are more striding in view of the fact that
2,360,000 more automobiles v/ere running in the past than
in the preceding fiscal year, which added number of cars
should normally have required cbuut 7,000, '^CC more tires
and 10,000,000 more inner tubes for replacements." - "Com-
merce Reports", October 25, 1926.
(j) "Commerce Yearbook", 1926, Vol. I p. 458
(k) "Facts and Figures of the Automobile Industry", 1929
edition. National Automobile Chamber of Commerce, New York,
p. 5.
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retailers. They were encouraged to carry smaller stocKs.
The result of a survey made shov/ed that on October 1, 1926,
dealers averaged 49.8 casings each as compared with 56.6
casings each on October 1, 1925. (l)
Finally, there were efforts to introduce economy
among the manufacturers. It was proposed to abolish fabric
tires, to eliminate some of the smaller sizes, standardize
the styles, and so simplify manufacturing processes as well
as reduce to a great extent the volume of stock necessary
for dealers to carry, (m)
Another improvement in marketing practice was tempo-
rarily effected. Tire manufacturers agreed to abandon the
custom of "spring dating" whereby orders were solicited in
October for spring requirements, and plants were run at
capacity during the winter to fill these orders. By post-
poning shipments of spring stocks until March 1, and manu-
facturing meanwhile on;i.y enough tires for current require-
ments the industry v/as able to postpone its demand for crude
rubber and help to relieve the market situation. Dealers
were also urged to dispose of surplus stocks before ordering
more. This abolition of spring dating was credited with
(1) "India Rubber and Tire Review", Akron, Ohio, The India
Rubber Reviev/ Company, December 1986, p. 30.
(m) These and other measures for reducing stocks were only
temporary expedients and would not reduce the long run demand
for rubber.
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causing a decline in the price of crude rubber froni $1.00
per pound to 91 cents the day after the manufacturers*
decision was made knovm.
The Department of Comjuerce also strongly urged the
use of substitutes. The most important was reclaimed
rubber, which development virtually created a new industry
in this country, (n) The production of reclaimed rubber
has been correlated closely with the price of crude so that
the low prices of 1980-22 made serious inroads on the in-
dustry but the high prices of 1925-26 put the industry back
on its feet.
The Stevenson Act thus operated much as a protective
tariff would have done. By maintaining an artificially high
price the infant industry of reclaiming was developed to
such a point that it is now able to stand on its own feet in
the face of full competition from crude rubber. It is prob-
able that ordinary demands of the rubber manufacturing indus-
try would have brought about this same development in the
course of time without restriction but it is no doubt true
that the development was hastened thereby.
Synthetic rubber was produced in considerable quanti-
ties by German scientists during the war but the costs were
(n) Reclaimed rubber is obtained from old tires, old shoes,
and other kinds of worn out rubber goods.
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prohibitive under normal conditions and in quality it was
distinctly inferior.
Effect on Manufacturers
Cost to the Manufacturers
Since a consignment of rubber is ordinarily contract-
ed for months before it is received in this country there is
always a distinct lag betv/een market price and import value.
The practice of making forward contracts for still longer
periods increases this tendency even further. Thus in July
1S25, when market price averaged $1,051, the average price
of imports for the month was only $.463, and the peak of
import prices, $.797, v/as not reached until February of the
following year, or a quarter of a year after the month of
highest average market price. Similarly, the average market
price for 1925 and 1926 was $.725 and $.487 respectively
while the average import value was higher in 1926 than in
1925, being $.546 as compared with $.484. This explains why
imports 4.2 percent greater than in 1925 cost us 17.7 percent
more. The chart on the next page shows that the average
price actually paid for rubber imports fluctuates much less
than market price and that changes in the market price are
reflected in changes in the import price with a lag of from
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two to three months.
Vrtiile some manufacturers made considerable savings
during the period of rising and high prices by reason of
forward contracts, many importers concluded contracts at
this time running as far ahead as 1930 at prices which
later proved to be needlessly high.
During the first years of restriction no distinct
effect upon the sale of tires was observable. The rising
prices of crude rubber during 1925, the extensive publicity
given to restriction, and the increases made in the price
of tires led to a very keen demand on the part of consumers
of tires. The incentive was fear of further increases and
a desire to obtain a supply before increases became effective.
So each increase in price of crude rubber served to stimulate
the purchase of tires.
The productive capacity of tire manufacturers was
greatly stimulated during the war so that when slump condi-
tions cajne in 1920 they found themselves with plants far
larger than the market justified. The result was a bitter
competition resulting in losses for many and failure to
some. A steady improvement followed during 1923-24 because
of the stable prices of crude rubber and general prosperity
throughout the country. 1925 brought large profits to the
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industry. Therefore instead of high prices of crude rubber
proving immediately injurious to the manufacturers they
were responsible for one of the best financial years in the
history of the industry. The explanation of this lies in
the stimulation given to buying and in the great appreci-
ation in the value of inventories.
Both these factors operated in the opposite direction
during the follov/ing years. Sales were unsatisfactory, even
where higher prices brought about a larger total value.
Many companies made forward contracts for a longer or shorter
period at prices above the prevailing rriarket price so that
they were using dear rubber in tires which had to be sold at
prices based on current quotations for crude rubber. Inven-
tories which had appreciated during previous years now
greatly declined in value. The result was a year of more
acute financial distress than the industry had knov/n since
the depression of 1920-21. (p) TaKing rubber manufacturing
as a whole only 55 percent of the establishments made prof-
its for the year, (q) Although the 45 percent which failed
to make profits were in general the smaller companies and
this 45 percent represented about 7 percent of the total
volume of sales, the larger companies with few exceptions
also saw their profits greatly reduced.
(p) "India Rubber and Tire Review", Akron, Ohio. May 1927
p. 18
(q) ibid., August 1927, p. 22
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Tire Prices
Up to the beginning of 1925 restriction had no
apparent effect upon tire prices unless the stability of
the price of crude rubber may have contributed to reduc-
tions. In any event tire prices at that time were the
lowest they had ever been, in addition to which the mile-
age given by the ordinary tire had been increased three
or four times, (r) Late in the spring of 1985 the rising
costs of crude rubber made advances in tire prices neces-
sary.
The increase in cost to the final purchaser was
considerable since all the agents in the process of dis-
tribution calculate on a percentage mark-up based on cost
to theiL. But it was alleged that even when allowance was
made for pyramiding the increase in cost to the consumer
was entirely out of proportion to the increased cost of
crude rubber, so that the manufacturers appeared to be
making use of restriction to extort unreasonably high
prices for their tires. It was claimed that an increase
of 111 in the cost of the crude rubber in a balloon tire
resulted in an increase of $28 in the price to the consumer.
The president of the United States Rubber Company stated
that the increase was entirely due to the increased cost
(r) "Rubber Age", November 25, 1926, p. 174
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of crude rubber but that an increase in tire prices would
have been necessary under ordinary conditions because com-
petition had driven prices below a remunerative level.
While charges of profiteering on the part of manu-
facturers seem largely unfounded the wide publicity given
these charges contributed to the weakness of demand on the
part of consumers and helps to explain the rapidity with
which quotations returned to low levels, (s)
Buyers* Pool
A Buyers* Pool was organized in December 1926 for
the purpose of stabilizing price. Amounting to $40,000,000
it was joined by leading tire and automobile manufacturers,
including the United States Rubber Company, Goodyear, Good-
rich, Fisk, Firestone, Kelly-Springfield, and others; and
General Motors, Dodge Brothers, Willys-Overland, Packard,
Studebaker, and others, (t)
The General Rubber Company, a subsidiary of the
United States Rubber Company, had an organization in the
middle east and was appointed to act as buying agent for
the pool. The purpose of the pool was to lend stability
to the market and to this end it was planned to acquire a
reserve between 25,000 and 50,000 tons of rubber which the
(s) "India Rubber and Tire Review", Akron, Ohio, May 1927
p. 15
(t)'ibid., December 1926, p. 15
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pool would hold in this country as a precaution agsinst
price fluctuations in the future, (u) In addition it was
suggested that by timely purchases the pool might check
the fall in prices and so reduce the loss to njanufacturers
on their inventories.
The pool was a definite stabilizing force in the
market and it was given considerable credit for the notably
steady prices of 1927. By the summer of 1928 the pool was
completely liquidated and losses amounting to nearly
000,000 were alleged to have been incurred by it.
Foreign Traae
The improved prices following restriction served to
increase the cost of our imports. This tendency became
very marked in 1925 when an increase of less than 21 percent
in volume of imports represented an increased cost of 147
percent and again in 1926 when imports 26 percent greater
in voluiiie than in 1924 cost the importers 190 percent more
than in 1924. The average import prices of crude rubber
are shov/n on the following page.
As a result, principally, of this great increase in
crude rubber, it became our most important import during
these years. It increased from 4.8 percent of our total
(u) "India Rubber and Tire Review", Akron, Ohio, Deceij.ber
1926, p. 30
J
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imports to 10.2 percent in 1925 and 11.4 percent in 1926. (v)
Furthermore, it was a considerable factor in the decline
in the so-called favorable balance of trade both years.
Table XII
Average Import Price of Crude Rubber (w)
1921 .178
1922 .151
1923 .267
1924 .237
1925 .484
1926 .546
1927 .556
1928 .250
fv) "Commerce Yearbook", 1925, 1926
(w) ibid., 1929 Vol. I, p. 468

Effect on the Investor
A recent estimate found that the total capital
invested in plantations is about $90,000,000 of which the
British, including natives in Malaya and Ceylon, hold 58
percent and the Dutch 15 percent, while Americans trail
with 3.7 percent, (x) Despite the growing importance of
Dutch and native rubber, the British represented the
largest share of capital in the industry throughout the
period of restriction.
Rubber prices in 1980-2S were so low that the
returns to the plantation companies were often below the
all-in cost of production. The rise in rubber prices
following enactment of restriction remedied this situation
and profits rose steadily during 1923, 1924, and 1925.
Dutch comps.nies in the unrestricted areas were benefited
relatively much more by the improved prices but for this
reason the increase in their gains during 1925 was less
than for the British companies. The Dutch companies were
not able to increase their output to the same extent rela-
tively and, furthermore, forward contracts for a large part
of their output reduced the gain that might have accrued
from the increase in prices, (y) This situation is indica-
ted by the figures of the profits made by Dutch and British
x) "India Rubber World", November 1, 1927, p. 65
y) "London Economist", May 21, 1927, p. 1070
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rubber companies froiu 19g0 to 1925.
Table XIII
Profits Made by Dutch and British Bubber Coiripanies (z)
(percentages)
~
Dutch (1) British
1920 1.2 (2) 11.4
1921 9.1 (2) 1.0
1922 2.6 3.7
1923 9.3 6.8
1924 10.3 8.0
1925 21.6 23.8
(1) Figures represent 78 percent of the Dutch companies
(2) Deficit
Experience with forward contracts indicates that
the general attitude of the shareholders is that they are
all right only if you win. YvTien prices rise company direc-
tors are blamed for the forward contracts they have made,
while on a falling market they are blamed for not having
sold more, A study made of forv/ard sales by plantation
companies during 1925 and 1926 shows that the rising prices
of 1925 led to unusually heavy forward commitments while
the falling prices in the next year caused them to be few.
One of the most common objections offered to the
practice of forv/ard selling is that it tends to depress the
spot price of rubber at the time of delivery. The argument
(z) "London Economist", May 21, 1927, p. 1070
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is that manufacturers who have bought a large part of
their requirements can dejjress day-to-day price by delib-
erately refraining from buying. It was on this ground
that the Rubber Grov;ers» Association declared its oppo-
sition to forward selling. On the other hand, this over-
looks the fact that forward sales reduce supplies to the
same extent that they reduce the amount demanded and it
would seem that by enabling the producers of rubber to
cover the most urgent of their necessary expenses through
the return froHi their forward sales the riiOre exigent sellers
have been itept off the market. Therefore, little weight
can be conceded to this objection.
Another objection advanced against forward selling is
that it is gambling. Knowing how widely rubber prices have
fluctuated in the past, however, it would seem that the
directors who refuse, when the opportunity is offered, to
sell at least a part of their output at a price which en-
sures them of a reasonable margin above cost of production
are indulging in speculation rather than those who do not
make such sales, A sounder policy and one quite v*idely
followed, is to sell sufficient rubber ahead to cover cost
of production and operation, leaving the balance for current
marketing
.
It was claimed that no company was able to pay divi-
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dends out of profits made f ron. the sale of rubber at or
near the prevailing market price during 1920-82. Many
companies were able to make greater profits during 1926
than during 1925 partly because of favorable forward con-
tracts.
Companies v/hich did not make forward contracts
during 1925-26, and some contracts were closed to run as
far as 1930, obtained returns considerably in excess of
market quotations. A tabulation made in August 1926 of
450 British plantation companies having a combined total
standard production of 149,328 long tons showed that 85,
198 tons had been sold forward over a period of years at
an average price of $.557 per pound, (aa) These same
companies reported all-in costs of $.203 per pound.
A proposal for controlling prices through long-
term contracts was considered during the rubber shortage
of 1925. Failure to do so was extremely fortunate for the
manufacturers since these contracts would have been based
on prices prevailing at the time, the extent of the price
reaction being anticipated by no one.
Experience with forward selling under restriction
indicates the wisdom of maintaining such a policy. V.Tiile
certain companies failed to make extremely large gains
(aa) "India Rubber and Tire Review", December 1926, p. 28
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they might have during 1925-26 through forward commitments,
still larger sums were lost by other growers because of
failure to sell ahead during boom prices. The high prices
realized at this time discouraged the making of forward
contracts at reasonable prices by giving producers an
exaggerated confidence in the ability of restrictive measures
to maintain high prices. This is another instance in which
the Stevenson Plan worked hardship by the uncertainty which
it introduced into the market situation.
The gradual improvement in profits and dividends
from the time of the passage of restriction up to the period
of the rapid rise in rubber prices in 1S85 was manifested.
The price rise that occurred in 1925 resulted in greatly in-
creased profits and dividends.
The movement of share values was less gradual than
that of profits and dividends and had tended to follow com-
modity prices. Thus, a marked increase occurred just after
the passage of restriction but with lower prices at the end
of 1923 and during 1924 shares declined, in the case of the
companies in restricted countries, below the level prevail-
ing before restriction. Shares reached their highest level
early in December 1925, when the shares of many of the
companies were at least double their price at the beginning
of the year, while the shares of some were fbur times as high
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as they had been at that time. From this peak there was a
gradual decline. A slight improvement in share quotations
occurred from time to time, as v/hen prices revived and
again when the American Pool was announced but the trend
had been steadily downward.
Table XIV
Indexes of Prices of Crude Rubber & Rubber Company Shares (bb)
End of Rubber Shares of 52
Rubber Companies
January 1925 100 100
March 182 105
May 207 106
July 256 145
September 242 177
November 314 208
January 1926 193 196
February 148 180
March 166 199
April 135 185
May 118 182
Despite the fact that sterling companies in unrestric-
ted areas voluntarily practiced restriction their shares rose
relatively more than did those of companies in restricted
countries . Similarly, they declined less during the slump
(bb) "London Economist", June 12, 1926, p. 1155
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years 1925-84, This result was expected, since freedom
from compulsory restriction made it possible, at least,
for these companies to earn larger dividends and would
have been still greater but for voluntary restriction.
It is also seen from the quotations for 1929 that the
shares for companies in unrestricted areas lost much of
their relative gain following removal of restriction.
The position of rubber companies improved with
respect to reserves. During slump years profits were small
or non-existent so that considerable sums were feken from
reserves. VJith increase in rubber prices an increasing
proportion of profits was devoted to reserves. For a tirr.e
the rubber industry was devoting less of its profits to
reserves than other industries were doing but as profits
became greater this condition was remedied. The practice
of paying large dividends in the rubber industry made it
difficult to strengthen reserves at the expense of divi-
dends. This failure to provide more fully to reserves was
largely due to the desire of stockholders to realize large
dividends by way of recouping for the lean years of 1920-22.
Furthermore, general overconfidence in restriction and the
belief in its permanence tended to make directors neglect
conservative policies.
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Organization of New Companies
The high prices of the boom period led to the
formation of a number of new companies and an extension of
operations in existing companies. Native planting was ex-
panded to a still greater extent and planting in unrestric-
ted areas exceeded that of restricted countries. In dif-
ferent ways therefore, the predominance of the B ritish
rubber ovvnirig interests had been reduced. The lead of the
British in rubber production seems to be seriously menaced
and in view of the large amount of new planting, as well
as the development of the reclaiming industry there is
little probability that the price of rubber will be as high
in the future as it has been. The period of general high
profits for rubber plantations seems to be at an end. The
general level of profits will be similar to that of other
established industries. Although these changes might have
occurred in any case they were hastened by restriction.
The investing country is more affected by high prices
for rubber than is the producing country so far as the actu-
al amount received is concerned. For where the capital in-
vested is ovmed abroad the chief share going to the produc-
ing country consists in the payment for the costs of pro-
duction and these do not vary materially whether the price
be high or low, although the volume produced is of cons id-
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erable significance. The return to the investing country
on the other hand, depends upon the excess above the cost
of production and where profits have been low they may be
multiplied many times by only a slight change in price.
To the extent therefore, that the Stevenson Act contribu-
ted to an increase in the price of rubber, the investing
country increased its share relatively more than the pro-
ducing country, (cc)
(cc) VyHtiittlesey, Charles R., "Governmental Control of Crude
Rubber", 1931, pp. 172-173

PART FIVE
Collapse of the British Scheme

In 1925 a combination of forces was set in motion
which was to undermine this restrictive plan. A tremen-
dous demand came into the market for raw rubber in that
year, induced principally by an unprecedented expansion
of the motor-car industry in this country, and further
stimulated by the introduction of ballon tires. Prices
for rubber quickly swept beyond the so-called "fair price"
of Is. 3d. on which the Stevenson Act was originally based;
and partly as a result of increased demand, partly as a
result of the artificial restrictions of this Act, contin-
ued to climb until they had reached around i|1.20 a pound.
Even at this level, 100 percent export was not permitted
by British Authorities,
It was this maintenance of the regulation of supply,
at a time when prices had long since exceeded the level
necessary to pay fair returns to producers, that sounded
the death-imell of the measure. V^/hile the costs of pro-
duction of British planters were being increased through
the policy of curtailment and the expenses of enforcing
the provisions of the law, new stimulus was being imparted
to rubber production elsewhere. The Dutch East Indies
now, able to produce at lower cost than the British because
they were unrestricted by hampering legislation increased
95
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their output rapidly; American manufacturers built up a
reserve pool. Three of them, the largest buyers of crude
rubber in the world, went into the planting business.
Development of rubber growing began in Africa and activ-
ity was increased in South America, and substitutes in the
form of reclaimed rubber^ improved methods of manufacturing
tires bringing about increased longevity of the average
tire and rubber obtained from guayule and other plants
began to sprout like mushrooms. Another American opposi-
tion to the curtailment policy was the organization of
the New York Rubber Exchange which provided an orderly
market for trading.
The following table shows the dynamic nature of
demand of the tire industry:
Table XV
U.S. Production of Automobile Casings by Types 1910-1929 (a)
Fabric High Process
Cord
Balloon 6 to 8 Ply Total
1910
1920
1925
1926
1929
100
65
14.1
5.3
51.8
47.2
25.1
35
34.1
42.5
58.0
5.0
16.9
100
100
100
100
100
(a) Fraser, C.E., and Doriot, G.F., Op. Cit., p. 103
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Table XVI
U.S. Crude and Reclaimed Rubber Consumption (b)
(ooo»s of long tons)
Crude Reclaimed Ratio of Reclaimed
1925
1926
1927
928
929
1930
388
366
373
437
467
376
137
164
189
223
217
153
35.3
40
50.8
51.0
45.5
40.7
In 1928 the plan which obviously lacked flexibility
and was being obstinately retained was abandoned at the
demand of the planters in Malaya and Ceylon for whose
benefit it was adopted. Instead of making them rich it
kept them poor. Instead of bringing stabilized prosperity
it cost them their former dominance of the world rubber
market where five years previous British produced 75 per-
cent of the world »s rubber, in 1928 she produced 50 percent.
(b) Zimmerman, Erich Y/., "World Resources and Industries'^
1933, p. 393
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Table XVII
Average Price of Rubber & U.S. Share of World Production (d)
Plantation, Ribbed, United States Share of
Smoked Sheet V/orld Production
(per lb, N.Y.) (percentages)
1910 2.066 45
1911 1.413 44.6
1912 1.216 49
1913 .820 43.3
1914 .653 50.6
1915 .657 58
1916 .725 54.9
1917 .722 64.4
1918 .602 65.3
1919 .485 59.6
1920 .359 73
1921 .165 59.6
1922 .173 72.9
1923 .307 73.8
1924 .264 74.9
1925 .730 73
1926 .487 64.1
1927 .381 65.6
1928 .226 61.5
1929 .206 61.2
1930 .119 55.9
1931 .OGZ 59.1
1932 .035 55.7
1933(6 nios.) .0396
(d) "Statistical Abstract" of United States, 1933 p. 290

PART SIX
Conclusions and Future

Brazil has tried to regulate the price of coffee
and rubber; the state of Yucatan has endeavored to control
the price of sisal hemp; and nov/ Great Britain attempted
to regulate and stimulate the price of rubber. All attempts
have not met with \inqualified success.
Certain fundamental economic laws are working with
respect to the marketing of these staple commodities. The
efforts and legislation of man seem to have little success
in molding or changing the main currents of international
trade. Vvhen Brazil endeavored to raise the world price of
coffee by placing a large part of her crop in storage,
which was to be thrown on the market at a later unnamed
date, she attempted that which is directly in opposition to
definite economic laws. In the face of powerful economic
forces, which have turned rich producing areas into moras-
ses of poverty and financial despondency, and have caused
other areas commercially and agriculturally dead for cen-
turies to flourish like the proverbial bay tree, such at-
temps to control these forces seem puerile.
The British attempt to control the crude rubber
situation had been of an essentially different character.
Instead of striking at the results of overproduction, and
with characteristic willingness to face consequences, the
100
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British undertook to reduce production and to prevent the
recurrence of overproduction. The weak link in that chain
of cause and effect was that there were large areas of
rubber-producing country and prospective rubber-producing
country not under British control and hence, not subject
to the measures that have been taken. The British effort
appeared to be an honest attempt to work with econoir.ic
forces rather than against them, and its effects v/ere for
a period salutary and prices for a few years passed the
cost of production.
Reasons for lack of Success in Controlling Prices
of Staple Commodities (a)
The lack of success experienced by nations
and groups of producers in controlling and regulat-
ing prices seemed to be due to certain general
facts or principles:
1. Usually such attempts have been made
in the interest of a small producing
area, in the belief that it held control
over a certain commodity. Consequently
overconfidence has prompted attempts to
extort unusually high profits.
(a) Pratt, E.E,, "International Trade in Staple Commodities",
1988, p. 7
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2. Generally, such attempts have had as an
essential part of the plan, the concealment
of the quantity of production or the stocks
of the commodity on hand. Under modern
conditions this is almost impossible.
3. Such schemes have usually been based
on erroneous conceptions of the world
market for the comiriodity in question.
Producers usually exaggerate and grossly
so the size and urgency of the market
for the commodity in which they are
Interested. Their estimates of the
market *s ability to take are usually
far in excess of the facts.
4. Stocks of merchandise piling up in
warehouses, in the producing areas or at
seaboard, have proved more and more im-
possible to finance. Dealers everywhere
recognize such stocks are virtually on
the market and merely await their release.
Such stocks inevitably depress market
prices
.
5. Agricultural crops are notoriously
speculative. With striking frequency.
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bumper crops have been harvested at
the very moment when the greatest
curtailment of production is the
most obvious requisite to the
success of a scheme of control or
monopoly.
Probable conditions of success can only come
about in one of two general ways: First, by intelli-
gently controlling, regulating, and probably limiting
production, either current or prospective; or second,
by enlarging, broadening, or deepening the market, and
by improving, grading, and popularizing the product and
its derivatives.
The Increasing Importance of World Price Levels
With the improvement and cheapening of communication,
especially the telegraph, telephone, cable, and wireless,
such a thing as a local price for a staple commodity has
almost ceased to exist in any true sense of the term. Just
as the markets for staple commodities have become world
wide, so have the prices of these staples become world wide.
Prices have ceased to be made locally, or as the result of
local conditions. Except for tariff barriers, which are of
comparatively little importance in the case of staple raw
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commodities, there is comparative freedom of trade between
all producing areas on the one hand and all consuming areas
on the other. The development of rubber plantations in
the Far East vvellnigh ruined the rubber-producing sections
of Brazil. But less far-reaching changes take place from
season to season, A disastrous wheat crop in Argentina
may stimulate prices all over the rest of the world; while
during the next season a bumper crop in Canada may so de-
press prices as to cause hardship in the producing areas
of India and the Argentine. The prices of staple commodi-
ties today are world prices. They are regulated by condi-
tions of production and consumption in all of the producing
areas of the world. That area lagging behind in methods,
in efficiency, or in quantity, even by reason of conditions
over which it has no control, roust suffer the consequences.
Increasing Safety in the Conduct of International Trade in
Staple Commodities
The increasing safety with which the international
business in staple commodities is conducted is readily
apparent. There was a time when sea-going merchants
carried the burden of two risks, both entirely beyond their
control. One was the perils of the sea and the other was
the danger of an unstable market. The first of these risks
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was completely eliminated by the introduction of marine
insurance. The second has practically ceased to exist
in many lines by reason of the use of future contracts.
Although branded by many ignorant and unthinking persons
as vicious and unwholesome, as a method of gambling and
an instrument in raising prices, future trading has ac-
complished the following important results; (b)
1. It has enabled merchants to avoid the
danger and loss of shipping commodities
to markets where prices have fallen, and
has therefore reduced the cost of doing
business
.
S. It has made large-scale operations in
such commodities possible, again reducing
costs
.
5. It has made it possible for banks to
finance such transactions at a minimum of
risk and at low rates, still further re-
ducing costs of doing business.
4, It has made possible the useful employ-
ment of the speculator, who takes the risks
"A "A
(b) Pratt, E.E., "International Trade in Staple Commodities",
1928, p. 9
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and permits the real merchant to trade
safely.
5. It has tended by anticipating market
conditions to smooth out the violent
price fluctuations v/hich were at one time
the menace of the trade in practically
every staple.
If it were not for the facilities afforded by
future trading, international trade in staple commodities
would not be possible on the present scale or at the
present low cost.
Criticism of the Stevenson Act (c)
This criticism is divided into two parts, the first
relating to its effect upon the rubber market and the
second to its effect on the industry which it was designed
to assist.
The major weakness of the scheme from the standpoint
of its effect on price lay in its inelasticity. This de-
fect, which became most apparent during the period of run-
away prices of 1925-26, arose out of the provision that the
exportable quota could be increased by not more than 10 per-
(c) "Journal of Political Economy", August 1931, pp. 520-25
Charles R. '"Yhittlesey
.
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cent of standard production and only at quarterly Intervals.
While this provision was soiuewhat improved by later modifi-
cations, supply remained to the end, insufficiently respon-
sive to changes in price. Moreover, the Act is to be crit-
icized for having introduced great uncertainty into the
market. The panic in 1925 would probably have been avoided
if it had been made clear at the outset that the automatic
operation of the scheme would not be interfered with. The
failure of planters tu make forward sales at high prices
was due to their overconf idence in the ability of the plan
to bring about high prices, and for the same reason many of
them failed to set aside adequate reserves. There was also
a feeling of uncertainty arising from the existence of a
considerable volume of export coupons which might or might
not be thrown on the market, and also an uncertainty arising
at the end of the quarter when the average price happened to
be near a pivotal level, of the possibility of changes be-
ing made in the provisions of the act, and of the uncertain-
ty as to the continuance of restriction.
From the standpoint of the industry the fundamental
crlticizm of restriction lies in the fact that it stimulated
heavy planting both in restricted and unrestricted areas.
Vifhile restriction may have aided in bringing temporary re-
lief through higher prices, in so far as it led to increased
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planting it helped to exaggerate a condition of potential
overproduction, thus rendering worse the very situation
it was designed to relieve. Furthermore, many native
producers of rubber were led to abandon the production of
crops other than rubber to which they had been able to
turn at times of depression in the rubber industry. These
growers were less able to face a period of unrestrained
competition in the industry at the end of restriction than
they had been in 1922.
The Latest Rubber Scheme of Vtold Producers (d)
However bitter the experience vvdth the Stevenson
Restriction it is not deterring the setting up of another
control plan. British, Dutch, and French producers, re-
sponsible for more than 98 percent of the world *s output
of crude rubber had agreed in May 1934 to a five year
plan to control rubber exports in order to regulate and
raise prices.
This new plan does not atteiLpt to fix prices. It
prohibits further planting in present areas and limits
replanting of present plantations to 20 percent; it sets
a fixed maximum quota which each signatory can export in
(d) "Business Week", May 5, 1934, pp. 28-23
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each of the five years; it provides for an increase in
total exports of 25 percent over the five years from the
present 1,019,000 tons. Signatories include Malaya,
Netherlands, India, Burma, French Indo-China, North Borneo,
Sarawak, and Siam, The plan v/as supposed to become effec-
tive as soon as the various governments could pass the re-
quired legislation. Britain expected it to become operative
in the colonies in the following month.
London at the time had been anticipating the announce-
ment. Rubber shares boomed and caused heavy purchases of
rubber futures. The boom became so great that worried author-
ities recalled the failure of the previous scheme.
New York received news of the plan calmly, though not
without misgivings. Stocks on hanc were sufficient to meet
demand for the next ten months. However, large users are
wary of any scheme which restricts the export of a raw ma-
terial whose source is almost entirely under foreign con-
trol. Therefore, since producers are not likely to force
another threat on the consumer we can safely predict that
this plan will go the way of previous restriction schemes.
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